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NOTPETYA, NOT WARFARE: RETHINKING THE
INSURANCE WAR EXCLUSION IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL CYBERATTACKS
Katherine S. Wan*
Abstract: When an insurer wants to avoid coverage of a specific type of loss, it must
explicitly exclude the loss in its policy. The war exclusion is a typical exclusion found in
insurance policies that excuses insurers from covering losses caused by war or warlike actions.
Courts interpreting the exclusion have traditionally held that war must consist of hostilities
between sovereign nations. Despite the rise of state-sponsored cyberattacks, the United States
has been hesitant to officially declare war in response. Even still, insurers argue that their war
exclusions should apply to these new cyber losses. Courts are now tasked with reanalyzing the
war exclusion in the context of the rise of cyberwarfare. This Comment examines the history
of the war exclusion, the policy reasons behind burden allocation, and where cyberattacks fall
on the spectrum between war and terrorism. Insurers should not be able to use the war
exclusion to escape liability for state-sponsored cyberattacks.

INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 2017, Mondel z In erna ional, one of he orld s larges
snack companies, had its multinational business interrupted by the
NotPetya cyberattacks.1 These attacks resulted in stolen user credentials
and the physical loss of thousands of computers and servers.2 Mondel z
estimated that it lost over $100 million from hardware and business
interruption as a result of the cyberattacks.3 Mondel z was one of many
corporations to suffer losses from this global incident.4
Almost eight months after the attack, the United States government
announced its conclusion that the Russian military was responsible for the
NotPetya attacks.5 Mondel z submitted a claim under its commercial
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank the
attorneys at Gordon Tilden Thomas & Cordell, especially Frank Cordell and Susannah Carr, for their
insight and expertise. I would also like to thank my colleagues at Washington Law Review for helping
me polish this Comment for publication.
1. Adam Satariano & Nicole Perlroth, Big Companies Thought Insurance Covered a Cyberattack.
They May Be Wrong., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/
technology/cyberinsurance-notpetya-attack.html [https://perma.cc/2CBH-P2ND].
2. Complaint at 2 3, Mondel z Int l, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 2018L011008 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 10, 2018), 2018 WL 4941760.
3. Id. at 3.
4. See Satariano & Perlroth, supra note 1.
5. Press Briefing, The White House, Statement from the Press Sec y (Feb. 15, 2018) [hereinafter
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property insurance policy, which covered physical loss or damage to
electronic data.6 Mondel z s ins rer, Z rich, denied he claim nder he
polic s ar or arlike ac s e cl sion.7 On October 10, 2018, Mondel z
filed a lawsuit against Zurich in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois.8 The case is currently pending.9
The policy at issue in the Mondel z lawsuit is an all risk property
insurance policy.10 An all risk property insurance policy provides first
party coverage for losses o he ins red s proper ca sed b all perils
not specifically excluded b he polic lang age.11 In general, an insurer
may include exclusions or limitations in its policy with the insured as part
of its freedom to contract.12 However, under the doctrine of contra
proferentem, the terms of an exclusion are generally construed strictly
against the insurer.13 This doctrine resolves all ambiguities in favor of the
insured because of the presumed imbalance of bargaining power between
the parties.14 If the risk is deemed to be generally included within the terms
of the policy, courts will find coverage unless the insurer can show that
the parties clearly intended to exclude the loss.15
The war and warlike actions exclusion at issue in Mondel z s s i
against Zurich is a common exclusion in property policies, which
typically states that the insurer is not liable for losses caused by war or
Statement from the Press Secretary], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statementpress-secretary-25/ [https://perma.cc/7YM2-G4S2].
6. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 3.
7. See id. at 4.
8. See id. at 1.
9. See Docket, Mondel z Int l, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 2018-L-011008 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct.
10, 2018).
10. Complaint, supra note 2, at 1.
11. STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 10A COUCH ON INS. § 148:4 (3d ed. 2019). The other type of insurance
that is commonly issued is liability insurance. See Elisa Alcabes et al., A Concise Guide to Insurance
Litigation in USA, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx
[https://perma.cc/WD3A-ULHH]. In the commercial context, the standard liability insurance would
be a commercial general liability policy. Id. Liability policies protect the insured from liability when
third parties are injured and sue the insured. Id. This Comment is not concerned with liability policies
and will focus on the interpretation of all risk property insurance policies.
12. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 2 COUCH ON INS. § 22:31 (3d ed. 2019).
13. See Universal Cable Prods., LLC v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019)
( Under he doc rine of con ra proferen em, an ambig i in an e cl sion is generall cons r ed
agains he ins rer and in fa or of he ins red. ).
14. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1000 (2d Cir. 1974)
( [I] is no s fficien for he all risk ins rers case for hem o offer a reasonable in erpre a ion nder
which the loss is excluded; they must demonstrate that an interpretation favoring them is the only
reasonable reading of a leas one of he rele an erms of e cl sion. ).
15. STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 12, § 22:31.
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warlike actions.16 This exclusion is not difficult to apply during times of
declared war.17 However, the application becomes more complicated
when countries, such as the United States, blame foreign nations for
attacks but do not formally declare war.18 For example, the United States
government blamed North Korea for hacking Sony in 2014 and causing
an es ima ed $100 million in damage, b labeled he a ack c berandalism, no ar.19
Additionally, the rise of terrorism in the twentieth century has made it
more difficult to differentiate acts of war from acts of terrorism. 20 War
must consist of hostilities between sovereign nations.21 Under the Hague
Convention, a soldier must be under the command of a responsible party,
carry arms openly, wear distinctive insignia, and operate lawfully in
accordance with the laws and customs of war to be considered an
operative of war.22 In contrast, Black La Dic iona defines terrorism
as [ ]he se or hrea of iolence o in imida e or ca se panic, esp[eciall ]
as a means of achie ing a poli ical end. 23 The entry notes various types
of terrorism some committed by state-actors, some committed by
unaffiliated individuals, and some committed by political organizations
unattached to any specific country.24 While courts have applied the war
exclusion to losses caused by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
(hereinafter 9/11 attacks), they have refused to expand the coverage to

16. STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:1 ( Mos proper ins rance policies pro ide
coverage on an all-risk basis. However, all-risk policies do not cover all losses, but contain at least
four exclusions that may be relevant to war or war-related losses. The first exclusion, the war
e cl sion, foc ses on he na re of he ac and he ac ors. ); see also Pan Am. World Airways, 505
F.2d a 994 (e cerp ing he e cl sion lang age from Pan Am s polic i h Ae na).
17. See Vanderbil . Tra elers Ins. Co., 184 N.Y.S. 54, 56 (S p. C . 1920), aff d, 194 N.Y.S. 986
(App. Div. 1922), aff d, 235 N.Y. 514 (1923); In l Dair Eng g Co. of Asia, Inc. . Am. Home
Assurance Co., 352 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff d, 474 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1973).
18. See Statement from the Press Secretary, supra note 5 (blaming Russia for NotPetya attacks but
not declaring war).
19. See Matthew Foy & Jonathan Schwartz, Son In e ie Q agmi e: A Wa e hed Momen fo
Cyberinsurance, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., Spring 2015, at 73, 77.
20. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff d, 751 F.3d 86 (2d Cir.
2014).
21. See Pan Am. World Airways, 505 F.2d at 990.
22. See Hague Convention (II) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the
Convention, July 29, 1899, § 1, ch. 1, art. 1 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The Hague Convention
governs and defines laws of war and war crimes in international law. See Hague Convention, ENCYC.
BRITANNICA (June 8, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/event/Hague-Conventions
[https://perma.cc/WJ2L-FLEF].
23. Terrorism, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
24. Id.
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other acts of terror.25
Terrorist activities have evolved alongside modern warfare,
incorporating and utilizing new technologies such as the internet and
leading to the rise of cyberattacks.26 A cyberattack is defined by the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary as an a emp o gain illegal access o a
computer or computer system for the purpose of causing damage or
harm. 27 In 2017, former Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein
es ima ed ha he mone ar cos s of global ann al c bercrime will
do ble from $3 rillion in 2015 o $6 rillion in 2021. 28 FBI Director
Chris opher Wra
arned Congress ha he freq enc and impac of
cyber-a acks on o r Na ion s pri a e sec or and Go ernmen ne orks
have increased dramatically in the past decade and are expected to
con in e o gro . 29 With the increase in cyberattacks, corporate victims
have tried to recoup their losses through their insurers.30 Courts have
generally struggled to interpret archaic policies in light of the modern
tools of attack, in part because cyberattacks can be perpetrated by a variety
of parties.31
This Comment explores the application of the war exclusion clause in
all risk property insurance policies to deny liability for losses caused by
foreign cyberattacks. Part I discusses the traditional use of the war
exclusion clause in all risk property policies, beginning with the common

25. Compare In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d at 514 (applying war exclusion to insurance
claim arising from 9/11 attacks), with Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1015 (declining to
apply war exclusion for loss caused by Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) airplane
hijacking).
26. See generally Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att y Gen., Remarks at the 2017 North American
International Cyber Summit (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorneygeneral-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-2017-north-american-international [https://perma.cc/PV78
2LMU]; World-Wide Threats: Keeping America Secure in the New Age of Terror: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 115th Cong. 29 (2017) [hereinafter World-Wide Threats] (statement
of Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation).
27. Cyberattack, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ cyberattack
[https://perma.cc/Z8PT-45S2].
28. Rosenstein, supra note 26.
29. World-Wide Threats, supra note 26 (statement of Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of
Investigation).
30. See generally Thomas D. Hunt, The In e ne of B ilding : In ance of C be Ri k fo
Commercial Real Estate, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 397, 405 (2019) (noting that insurers collected $3.25
billion in cyber insurance premiums from businesses in 2016 and expect to quadruple revenue by
2025).
31. See Foy & Schwartz, supra note 19; Rosenstein, supra note 26. ( Toda , he a acks are
concerted efforts by sophisticated individuals, criminal enterprises, or nation-states that can target a
range of home users, businesses, networks, or critical infrastructure with laser-like precision to cause
idespread damage. ).
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la applica ion in he Uni ed Kingdom hro gh he Second Circ i s
decisions in the 1980s.32 Part II anal es he Nin h Circ i s applica ion
of the war exclusion in 2019 and its invocation of the political question
doctrine.33 Part II then discusses the history of the political question
doc rine and he co r s pas prac ice of keeping he de ermina ion of ar
a judicial question.34 Part III explores the history of cyberattacks and
highlights two recent ransomware attacks that have affected global
politics and insurance litigation the WannaCry and NotPetya
cyberattacks. Part IV examines terrorism and cyber insurance policies and
explains why they are not used by corporate insureds to recover from
state-sponsored cyberattacks. Finally, Part V asserts that insurers should
not be able to escape liability for cyberattacks using the traditional war
exclusion. For the purposes of applying the war exclusion, determining
sovereignty should be a judicial question rather than a political question.
Further, under the circumstances such as the NotPetya attacks, courts
should not permit insurers to use the war exclusion to escape their
contractual obligations to cover losses.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL USE OF THE WAR EXCLUSION
CLAUSE IN ALL RISK PROPERTY POLICIES ENCOURAGES
A NARROW APPLICATION

The war exclusion is a common exclusion found in commercial all risk
property insurance policies.35 While the exclusion is relatively easy to
apply in periods of declared war, it becomes more problematic when the
combatants do not clearly belong to a sovereign nation. Part I begins by
illustrating the industry rationale for writing the war exclusion and the
traditional application of the exclusion in the late nineteenth century. The
second section of Part I analyzes Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.36 and he case s more con emporar
application of the war exclusion in the face of the rise of terrorism in the
1970s. Finally, the last section of Part I discusses the development of the
idea of sovereignty and its relationship with terrorism and civil unrest

32. See Britain S.S. Co. v. The King [1919] 1 K.B. 575; Holiday Inns Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571
F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
33. See Universal Cable Prods., LLC v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2019).
34. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974);
Holiday Inns, 571 F. Supp. 1460.
35. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:1.
36. 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
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through the Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Co.37 case.
A.

The Application of the War Exclusion and Traditional Warfare

Insurance companies developed the war exclusion to eliminate the
ins rer s liabili for losses ha occurred during war because i [ as]
impossible o e al a e he po en ial ins red risks. 38 In the insurance
ind s r ,
ar has a er specific meaning.39 Bo h English and
American cases dealing i h he ins rance meaning of ar ha e defined
it in accordance with the ancient international law definition: war refers
to and includes only hostilities carried on by entities that constitute
go ernmen s a leas de fac o in charac er. 40 In other words, war in the
insurance context is limited to hostilities between de jure or de facto
sovereign entities.41 Because of the unpredictable and potentially
catastrophic nature of war, the insurance industry decided that it was
better to exclude war losses instead of attempting to calculate premiums
to accommodate such losses.42 The risk of war losses was instead shifted
to the governments waging them.43
Courts have contemplated the impact of war on insurance recovery
since at least the American Civil War.44 For example, in the 1871 case
Welts v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.,45 the New York Court of
Appeals held that the death of a civilian railroad worker near a
Confedera e mili ar encampmen did no fall nder he defendan s ar
exclusion clause.46 As the twentieth century saw two world wars, the
number of insurance claims subject to the war exclusion significantly
increased.47 These cases focused on physical losses that occurred during
37. 571 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
38. STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:1.
39. See Holiday Inns, 571 F. Supp. at 1464 65.
40. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 F.2d at 1012.
41. See id. a 1005 ( [F]or here o be a ar a so ereign or quasi-sovereign must engage in
hos ili ies. ); see also The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666 (1863)
( A ar ma e is here one of he belligeren s, claims so ereign righ s as agains he o her. ).
42. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:1.
43. See Pan Am. World Airways, 505 F.2d a 994. In his specific case, Pan American had o rn
to the United States government for war risk coverage for the excess over the London Market [insurer]
limi . Id.
44. See Welts v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 N.Y. 34 (1871).
45. 48 N.Y. 34 (1871).
46. Id. at 39 40.
47. See, e.g., Britain S.S. Co. v. The King [1919] 1 K.B. 575 (holding war exclusion did not apply
to a boat that ran aground due to war-mandated altered course); Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers
Fire Ins. Co., 282 F. 976 (2d Cir. 1922) (holding that a ship s head-on collision with another ship due
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periods of declared war between sovereign nations. For example, in
Vanderbilt v. Travelers Insurance Co.,48 the war exclusion applied
beca se he Lusitania was sunk in accordance with the instructions of a
sovereign government, Germany, by naval forces of that government,
during a period when a war was in progress between Great Britain and
German . 49 Grounding decisions on the overt acts of sovereigns made
the application of the war exclusion relatively straightforward.
B.

Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. and the Modern Interpretation of the War and Warlike
Operations Exclusions

Although the United States has not officially declared war since World
War II,50 insurers have continued to use the war exclusion in an attempt
to escape liability for certain losses. Modern decisions on the application
of the war exclusion most often cite to Pan American World Airways, Inc.
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Pan Am).51 The case involved a Pan
American World Airways (Pan Am) flight that was hijacked by two
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).52
The hijackers seized control of the plane over London, forced the crew to
fly to Beirut and Cairo, evacuated all of the passengers, and then destroyed
the plane.53 Pan Am submitted a claim to Aetna to recover the loss from
he aircraf s des r c ion, b Ae na denied the claim, citing the war
exclusion in Pan Am s all risk proper polic .54 Specifically, Aetna relied
on a usurped powers exclusion and an industry-standard war exclusion:
C. This policy does not cover anything herein to the contrary
notwithstanding loss or damage due to or resulting from:
to poor visibility as a result of a British order to sail without lights did not trigger the war exclusion);
Vanderbilt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 N.Y.S. 54, 56 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff d, 194 N.Y.S. 986 (App. Div.
1922), aff d, 235 N.Y. 514 (1923) (holding that death in sinking of the Lusitania was excluded under
war exclusion); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54 (1950) (holding a ship s collision with
a minesweeper in 1942 did not qualify under the war exclusion).
48. 184 N.Y.S. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff d, 194 N.Y.S. 986 (App. Div. 1922), aff d, 235 N.Y. 514
(1923).
49. Id. at 56.
50. U.S. SENATE, OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS OF WAR BY CONGRESS, https://www.senate.
gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm
[https://perma.cc/S842-AHWR].
51. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Sept. 11
Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff d, 751 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2014); Universal Cable
Prods., LLC v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2019).
52. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1974).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 994 96.
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1. capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detention or the
consequences thereof or of any attempt thereat, or any taking of
the property insured or damage to or destruction thereof by any
Government or governmental authority or agent (whether secret
or otherwise) or by any military, naval or usurped power, whether
any of the foregoing be done by way of requisition or otherwise
and whether in time of peace or war and whether lawful or
unlawful (this subdivision 1. shall not apply, however, to any such
action by a foreign government or foreign governmental authority
follow-the forceful diversion to a foreign country by any person
not in lawful possession or custody of such insured aircraft and
who is not an agent or representative, secret or otherwise, of any
foreign government or governmental authority) [hereinafter
clause 1 ];
2. war, invasion, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection or
warlike operations, whether there be a declaration of war or not
[hereinafter clause 2 ];55
Using this language, Aetna tried to escape liability and argued that Pan
Am s ar ins rers sho ld co er he loss ins ead.56 If the attack was
considered a warlike action, Pan Am would have sought coverage from
he Uni ed S a es go ernmen beca se American nder ri ers do no
ri e ar risk co erage. 57 When interpreting the Aetna policy language,
the court relied on the doctrine of contra proferentem.58 Contra
proferentem provides that when there is ambiguity in an exclusionary term
found in a policy of insurance, the term should be resolved in the favor of
he ins red beca se of he ins rer s enhanced bargaining po er.59
Because Aetna was aware of the threat of political plane hijackings at the
time the policy was purchased, the Second Circuit reasoned that Aetna
should have decided to use more precise exclusionary language in
section C.1 of the policy to clarify the ambiguity in coverage.60
The court hen disc ssed ha q alified as
ar nder he polic ,
de ermining ha
ar is a co rse of hos ili engaged in b en i ies ha
55. Id. at 994 (emphasis added).
56. See id. Pan Am had separate insurance coverage through Lloyd s underwriters that specifically
covered the war risks that Aetna s policy excluded. See id. At the time, the London insurance market
was the only insurance market in which aviators could obtain war risk coverage. See id. Pan Am then
obtained excess war risk coverage through the United States government through the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958. See id.; see also Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1531 42 (1970).
57. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 F.2d at 994.
58. Id. at 999 1000.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1000 01.
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ha e a leas significan a rib es of so ereign . 61 Aetna attempted to
argue that a state of guerilla warfare existed between the United States
and the PFLP.62 However, the court rejected the notion that the PFLP was
a sovereign en i : [ ]he hijackers did no ear insignia. The did no
openly carry arms. Their acts had criminal rather than military overtones.
They were the agents of a radical political group, rather than a sovereign
go ernmen . 63
The court also rejected the notion that the damage caused by the PFLP
agen s as a arlike opera ion. 64 The Second Circuit agreed with the
dis ric co r s holding ha [ ]here is no arran in he general
understanding of English, in history, or in precedent for reading the phrase
arlike opera ions o encompass he inflic ion of in en ional iolence
by political, non-governmental groups upon citizens of non-belligerent
powers.65 The district court relied on a series of older British cases to
demonstrate that warlike operations have never been understood to
include violence by non-governmental entities in the common law
tradition.66 For example, in Henry & MacGregor (Ltd.) v. Marten,67 the
King s Bench held ha he damage ca sed o a ship ha rammed a
submerged object upon the mistaken belief that it was a German
s bmarine as a res l of a arlike opera ion beca se he ship s cap ain
attempted to act agains he co n r s declared enemies.68 The Second
Circuit also relied on the more recent case International Dairy
Engineering Co. v. American Home Assurance Co.69 The International
Dairy Co r fo nd ha he des r c ion of plain iff s bo ma erials in So h
Vietnam by American aerial parachute flares was the result of warlike
opera ions beca se [ ]he loss as a he si e of hos ili ies, i as ca sed
by a warlike agency, and the lost property was the property of a belligerent
na ional. 70 Based on this interpretation, the Pan Am court found that
here [ as] no basis ha soe er for den ing co erage nder he arlike
61. Id. at 1012.
62. See id. at 996.
63. Id. at 1015.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1015 16 (no ing ha [ ]he dis ric co r s holding is . . . supported by the weight of
a hori (citing Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098, 1130
(S.D.N.Y. 1973))).
66. See id. at 1016; Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. King [1918] 1 K.B. 307; Henry & MacGregor (Ltd.) v.
Marten [1918] 34 TLR 504, 505 (KB).
67. [1918] 34 TLR 504 (KB).
68. Id. at 505.
69. 352 F. Supp. 827, 828 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff d, 474 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1973).
70. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1017.
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operation exclusion because the Pan Am airplane did not carry military
cargo, was not destined for a theater of war, was not owned by a
belligerent of war, and did not plan to fly over any theater of war.71
C.

The Impact of Pan Am and Subsequent Applications of the War
Exclusion

Subsequent to Pan Am, the Southern District of New York further
analyzed what constitutes a sovereign in the context of the war exclusion
when a hotel was damaged in Beirut, Lebanon.72 When Holiday Inn made
a claim under its all risk property insurance policy for physical damage to
the hotel resulting from skirmishes between religious groups in the city,
Aetna denied liability.73 Aetna specifically cited the war exclusion in the
polic , hich e cl ded losses ca sed as a res l of [ ]ar, in asion, ac s
of foreign enemy, hostilities or warlike operations (whether war be
declared or not), civil war, mutiny, insurrection, revolution, conspiracy,
mili ar or s rped po er. 74 The court noted that while the press and
politicians were calling the situation in Lebanon a civil war, the meaning
of ar hen sed in ins rance policies as q i e differen from hose
of politics or journalism. 75
Instead, relying heavily on Pan Am and concl ding ha
ar req ired
conflict between two sovereigns, the court focused on determining
whether the religious factions skirmishing in Beirut qualified as
so ereigns or q asi-so ereigns. 76 In order for a group to qualify as a
sovereign or quasi-so ereign, i m s manifes a rib es of so ereign ,
which include staking out and maintaining adverse claims to territory and
making declarations of independence and sovereignty.77 However, if the
group is occ p ing erri or i hin a so ereign s a e pon he consen of
ha s a e s de j re go ernmen , hen ha gro p canno s fficien l sho
sovereignty.78 The court found that the religious groups at issue were not
sovereigns because they occupied land with the consent of the de jure
71. Id.
72. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
73. See id. at 1463.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1464; see also Spinney s (1948) Ltd. v. Royal Ins. Co., [1980] 1 Lloyd s Rep. 406 (QBD).
In that case, the British court held that the United Kingdom government s labelling of the unrest in
Lebanon as a civil war the same unrest that caused the damage to the hotel in the Holiday Inn case
was irrelevant to the interpretation of war in the insurance context. Id.
76. See Holiday Inns, 571 F. Supp. at 1500.
77. Id. (emphasis omitted).
78. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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government as understood in the insurance context.79 Although Syria
participated in the conflict, the court viewed this as a sovereign fighting
non-sovereign groups.80 In order for the war exclusion to apply, the
insurer needed to show that the loss was caused by fighting between two
sovereigns.81
II.

UNIVERSAL CABLE PRODUCTIONS AND DETERMINING
WHETHER WAR EXISTS IS A POLITICAL OR JUDICIAL
QUESTION

Un il he Nin h Circ i s decision in Universal Cable Productions, LLC
v. Atlantic Specialty Insurance Co.,82 the political question doctrine did
not play an impactful role in war exclusion litigation. By invoking the
political question doctrine, the Ninth Circuit revived a tool insurers could
use to prevent war exclusion cases from being litigated.83 The Second
Circuit had decided cases such as Pan Am with barely a cursory discussion
of the political question doctrine, instead focusing on rigorous case
analysis.84 This Par firs anal es he Nin h Circ i s applica ion of he
political question doctrine in Universal Cable and its interpretation of the
war exclusion. The second section of Part II briefly summarizes the
history of the political question doctrine and its relationship with judicial
interpretations of war in the United States.
A.

The Nin h Ci c i Rein oca ion of he Poli ical Q e ion
Doctrine in Universal Cable

In Universal Cable, the plaintiff sent a film crew to shoot a television
series in Jerusalem.85 Hamas shot rockets from Gaza into Israel, forcing
the crew to stop filming and relocate.86 Universal tried to claim the cost
of moving the film crew, but Atlantic Specialty denied the claim under
the war exclusion.87 The Atlantic Specialty policy excluded losses caused
by: (1) War, including undeclared or civil war; or (2) Warlike action by
79. See id. at 1501.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. 929 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2019).
83. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (holding that claim bringing political question is
nonjusticiable if the claim cannot be judicially defined or remedied).
84. See supra sections I.B, I.C.
85. Universal Cable Prods., 929 F.3d at 1149.
86. See id. at 1150.
87. See id.
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a military force, including action in hindering or defending against an
actual or expected attack, by any government, sovereign, or other
authority using military personnel or other agents . . . . 88 The court held
ha [b]o h
ar and
arlike ac ion b a mili ar force ha e a
speciali ed meaning in he ins rance con e 89 and ha
ar refers o and
includes only hostilities carried on by entities that constitute governments
a leas de fac o in charac er. 90 In contrast to Pan Am, the Universal Cable
Court declined to apply the contra proferentem doctrine because the
parties at issue were both sophisticated with relatively equal bargaining
power.91
Despite refusing to invoke contra proferentem, the court still did not
apply the war exclusion to the loss at issue.92 Unlike Holiday Inns, the
court here determined the sovereignty of Hamas not in an insurance
context but based upon the political stance of the United States.93 The
court relied on Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,94 hich held ha [w]ho is
the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but is a
political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the
judges . . . . 95 Beca se [ ]he Uni ed S a es has ne er recogni ed
Palestine or Gaza as sovereign territorial nations, nor has it ever
recognized Hamas as a sovereign or quasi-so ereign, he co r concl ded
that Hamas was not an entity that could trigger the war exclusion.96 The
co r reasoned ha beca se he Pales inian A hori is he de j re
government, and Hamas has recognized the Palestinian Authority as the
con rolling go ernmen of Pales ine, Hamas co ld no be a sovereign.97
Although the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the war exclusion in this
case, he co r s decision o res rrec he poli ical q es ion doc rine in i s
analysis has muddled future insurance litigation.

88. Id. at 1149.
89. Id. at 1147.
90. Id. at 1154.
91. See id. at 1151.
92. See id. at 1159 60.
93. See id. at 1148.
94. 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); see also Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. UPS, 177 F.3d 1142,
1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that even in the insurance context, sovereignty is a political, not a
judicial question).
95. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302.
96. Universal Cable Prods., 929 F.3d at 1148.
97. Id. at 1158.
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A Brief History of the Political Question Doctrine and Its
Relationship with War

Politically-charged facts are not the same as nonjusticiable political
questions.98 Courts use the political question doctrine to decline
jurisdiction over an issue that has been delegated to another branch of
government by the Constitution.99 The doctrine had not been invoked in
war exclusion insurance litigation until Universal Cable, with courts
preferring to analyze the specific facts of the case instead of only
governmental decisions.100 The political question doctrine was first
announced in the seminal case Marbury v. Madison,101 which determined
ha [q] es ions, in heir na re poli ical, or hich are, b he cons i ion
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in his co r . 102
The Supreme Court clarified when an issue is nonjusticiable under the
political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr,103 listing six factors for courts
to consider when deciding to apply the political question doctrine.104
In eres ingl , [ ]he Co r s mos comprehensi e effor o define he
parameters of political question doctrine came in [Baker,] a case far
removed from matters of war or its duration, and in which the Court
concluded that the dispute before it did not present a political ques ion. 105
Historically, courts have declined to invoke the political question
doctrine to determine the existence of war.106 Before Marbury was
decided, the Court already demonstrated its willingness to determine the

98. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the End of War, 99 MINN. L. REV. 143, 164 (2014).
99. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
100. See supra section II.A.
101. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
102. Id. at 170.
103. 369 U.S. 186.
104. Id. a 217 ( Prominen on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] he impossibili of a co r s nder aking independen resol ion i ho
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment
from m l ifario s prono ncemen s b ario s depar men s on one q es ion. ).
105. Pearlstein, supra note 98, at 169.
106. Id. a 157 ( Indeed, a number of contemporaneous statutes required similar inquiries into the
beginning and/or ending date of the war, and while the Court sometimes addressed the matter with
little or no analysis, in no case did it appear to contemplate declining jurisdiction over the issue as the
poli ical q es ion doc rine o ld req ire. ).
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existence of war for the purpose of statutory interpretation.107 In Bas v.
Tingy,108 the Court was asked to consider a dispute arising under a 1799
federal statute, which provided for certain rights to salvage for American
ships that were retaken from an enemy.109 The question for the Court was
whether the statute applied when a French merchant ship engaged with an
American ship during a period in which war was not yet declared.110 The
Court did not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction, reasoning that
[i]n fact and in law we are at war: an American vessel fighting
with a French vessel, to subdue and make her prize, is fighting
with an enemy accurately and technically speaking: and if this be
not sufficient evidence of the legislative mind, it is explained in
the same law.111
[E] en in he absence of a declaration of war by Congress, the Court
would interpret the law based on the world as the justices themselves
percei ed i , and did no delega e his de ermina ion o he e ec i e
branch.112
Even with the formal creation of the political question doctrine in
Marbury, courts continued to decide whether war existed for the purposes
of statutory interpretation. For example, in Ludecke v. Watkins113 the
Court interpreted the Alien Enemy Act114 nder he a hori ha
hen
the life of a statute is defined by the existence of a war, Congress leaves
the determination of when a war is concluded to the usual political
agencies of he Go ernmen . 115 The Court did not contradict its holding
in Baker beca se here is a difference be een he posi ion . . . that the
end of war depends, for purposes of the statute, on some kind of political
act, and he ie , hich [ he Co r ] a oids, ha ar s e is ence el non
is a non-justiciable political question. 116 Later, the Court emphasized that
nder he Cons i ion, one of he J diciar s charac eris ic roles is o
interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because
o r decision ma ha e significan poli ical o er ones. 117
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
4 U.S. 37 (1800).
Id. at 37.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Pearlstein, supra note 98, at 151.
335 U.S. 160 (1948).
50 U.S.C. § 21.
Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 169 n.13.
Pearlstein, supra note 98, at 164 (emphasis in original).
Japan Whaling Ass n . Am. Ce acean Soc , 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
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Like statutory claims, common law claims that involve politicallycharged facts are not the same as nonjusticiable political questions.118 In
Alperin v. Vatican Bank,119 a group of Holocaust survivors and their
descendants sued banks and political groups that profited from Nazi
activities during World War II.120 The plaintiffs brought claims of
conversion, unjust enrichment, and restitution (the Property Claims).121
The court held that the Property Claims were justiciable.122 Simpl
beca se a foreign bank is in ol ed and he case arises o of a poli icall
charged con e does no ransform the Property Claims into political
q es ions. 123 While war is a politically-charged topic, it is not completely
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.124 Once a poli ical
judgment is made to stop shooting, it must be within the power of the
courts to determine under the objective standard given by law whatever
the government subsequently says that hostilities have come to an
end. 125 Cases that involve facts shaped by a political decision such as
ending war are still justiciable if the issues can be measured by a legal
standard.
III. THE RISE OF STATE-SPONSORED CYBERATTACKS HAS
MUDDLED THE LINE SEPARATING THE WAR EXCLUSION
FROM THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
The inclusion of the political question doctrine in war exclusion
insurance litigation has complicated the already complex factfinding that
has evolved with the rise of state-sponsored cyberattacks.126 Cyberattacks
do not involve the traditional markers of warfare courts have used to
determine the applicability of the war exclusion in the past.127
118. See Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005).
119. 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005).
120. Id. at 533.
121. Id. at 548.
122. Id.
123. Id. The plain iffs also claimed ha he defendan s sed sla e labor d ring he ar ( he War
Objec i es Claims ). Id. However, the court held that the War Objectives Claims were nonjusticiable
under the political question doctrine because it did not want to speak for the U.S. government to
condemn the actions of a foreign government. Id. at 561 62. By deciding to adjudicate the common
law property claims and dismissing the war crimes claims, the Alperin Court preserved the separation
of powers between the court and the executive branch as it avoided addressing matters of foreign
relations and stuck to interpreting the law. Id. at 539.
124. See Pearlstein, supra note 98, at 167.
125. Id. at 218 19 (emphasis in original).
126. See infra Part V.
127. See supra Part I.
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Governments have also been quick to blame others for cyberattacks using
direct language that can lead the general public to believe the attacks to
be acts of war.128 Part III first discusses cyberattacks generally and uses
the WannaCry attacks as an example of recent ransomware cyber risks.
The second section of Part III examines the NotPetya cyberattacks,
specifically the lawsuit filed by Mondel z International as a result of its
losses s ffered from he a acks and he Uni ed S a es response.
A.

History of Cyberattacks and the Impact of the WannaCry
Cyberattacks

The threat of cyberattacks has been present since the propagation of the
internet, but has only become a major corporate and national security
threat in recent years.129 One of the most common types of malware used
to initiate cyberattacks is ransomware.130 Ransomware is defined by the
FBI as a pe of mal are ins alled on a comp er or ser er ha encr p s
he files, making hem inaccessible n il a specified ransom is paid. 131
The Department of Justice es ima ed in 2017 ha more han 4,000
ransomware attacks have occurred daily since January 1, 2016 [which] is
a 300% increase over the approximately 1,000 attacks per day seen in
2015. 132
One of the most notorious ransomware incursions prior to NotPetya
was the WannaCry attacks in May 2017.133 A group of hackers used a
s olen NSA ool kno n as ETERNALBLUE 134 to hack into Windows
computers and render them unusable unless the user paid a bitcoin
ransom.135 Microsoft issued a patch136 for this vulnerability, but many
128. See, e.g., Statement from the Press Secretary, supra note 5 (calling R ssian c bera ack he
mos des r c i e and cos l c bera ack in his or ).
129. Rosenstein, supra note 26.
130. Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the Emerging
Threat to Corporations, 86 TENN. L. REV. 503, 504 (2019).
131. Public Service Announcement, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Alert No. I-091516-PSA:
Ransomware Victims Urged to Report Infections to Federal Law Enforcement 1 (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.ic3.gov/media/2016/160915.aspx [https://perma.cc/FP4D-6LW5].
132. Rosenstein, supra note 26.
133. Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 130, at 524 25.
134. ETERNALBLUE is a zero-day exploit, a software vulnerability for Microsoft Windows for
which no patch or fix had been publicly released when it was initially stolen. See id. at 524.
135. Id.; Massive Ransomware Infection Hits Computers in 99 Countries, BBC (May 13, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39901382 [https://perma.cc/2JMF-97DD].
136. A patch is a software update usually comprised of code that is inserted or patched into an
existing program. It typically fixes a problem until the next version of the software is released. See
Patch, TECHOPEDIA (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.techopedia.com/definition/24537/patch
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older versions of Windows did not automatically install the patch.137
Attacks such as WannaCry render computing hardware useless unless a
ransom is paid.138 Companies that suffer such hardware, data, and time
losses might turn to their insurers for recovery.139 As a result of the attack,
more than 200,000 computers were infected in over 150 countries.140 The
attack is estimated to have cost between $4 billion and $8 billion in
damage worldwide.141 The United States attributed the attack to North
Korea.142 Although the Trump administration imposed sanctions on North
Korea, it did not call the attack an act of war.143
B.

The NotPetya Cyberattacks and the Response in the United States

One month after the WannaCry attacks, the NotPetya cyberattacks
struck across the globe.144 Like WannaCry, NotPetya was implemented
hro gh he s olen ETERNALBLUE NSA program.145 However,
NotPetya was significantly more damaging than WannaCry.146 NotPetya
was not technically ransomware because it irreversibly rendered affected
hardware inoperable.147 Even if victims paid the bitcoin ransom, the files
on the computers could not be recovered.148 Additionally, NotPetya could
affect computers with the Microsoft patch that had protected many
[https://perma.cc/BJ78-N9DL].
137. See Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in
History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russiacode-crashed-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/52ZU-DJK3] (no ing ha Maersk s less-than-perfect
sof are pa ching [and] o da ed opera ing s s ems made he compan
lnerable agains
NotPetya).
138. Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 130, at 507.
139. Companies affected by the WannaCry attacks included the British National Health Service,
Spanish telecom giant Telefonica, French car maker Renault, and United States shipping company
FedEx. See Massive Ransomware Infection Hits Computers in 99 Countries, supra note 135.
140. Russell Goldman, Wha We Kno and Don Kno Abo he In e na ional C be a ack, N.Y.
TIMES (May 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/international-cyber
attack-ransomware.html [https://perma.cc/TVW4-HSQ7].
141. Greenberg, supra note 137.
142. Press Briefing, The White House, Press Briefing on the Attribution of the WannaCry Malware
Attack to North Korea (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/pressbriefing-on-the-attribution-of-the-wannacry-malware-attack-to-north-korea-121917/
[https://perma.cc/HHD5-CZC2].
143. Id.
144. Satariano & Perlroth, supra note 1.
145. Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 130, at 532.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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machines from the WannaCry attacks in the previous month.149 Experts
estimated that NotPetya caused over $10 billion in damage, 150 hitting
companies across the world, from Ukraine to the United States to
Tasmania to Denmark.151
The NotPetya cyberattacks have come to the forefront of insurance
litigation as the world shifts from traditional land-warfare to
cyberwarfare.152 Mondel z International, the company that owns food
brands such as Cadbury chocolates and Ritz crackers, suffered an
estimated $100 million in damages after the cyberattacks left their
business operations floundering for weeks.153 Merck pharmaceuticals lost
millions from the same attack.154 Both companies have sued their property
insurers after their claims were denied under the war exclusion.155 These
pending cases have broad implications on how the commercial insurance
ind s r ill opera e mo ing for ard, as go ernmen officials, ho ha e
increasingly taken a bolder approach to naming-and-shaming state
sponsors of cyberattacks, . . . now risk becoming enmeshed in corporate
disp es b gi ing ins rance companies a ra ionale o den claims. 156
Mondel s case agains Z rich foc ses on he ar e cl sion in
Mondel s all risk proper ins rance polic .157 The policy is generally
supposed to cover physical losses caused by cyber events:
The Policy provides annual coverage incepting November 1,
2016, for all risks of ph sical loss or damage o MDLZ s
proper , specificall incl ding ph sical loss or damage o
electronic data, programs, or software, including physical loss or
damage caused by the malicious introduction of a machine code
or instruction . . . .
. . . TIME ELEMENT co erage, incl ding for Ac al Loss
Sustained and EXTRA EXPENSE incurred by the Insured during
the period of interruption directly resulting from the failure of the
Ins red s elec ronic da a processing eq ipmen or media o
149. Id. at 534.
150. Greenberg, supra note 137.
151. Id.
152. Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 130, at 535 ( NotPetya represents a startling escalation of
nation-s a e c ber ar. ); Greenberg, supra note 137 ( The release of No Pe a as an ac of c ber ar
by almost any definition . . . . ).
153. Satariano & Perlroth, supra note 1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Complaint at 4, Mondel z Int l, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 2018-L-011008 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 10, 2018), 2018 WL 4941760.
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opera e res l ing from malicio s c ber damage.158
Ho e er, he polic e cl des loss or damage res l ing from hos ile or
warlike action in time of peace or ar cond c ed b an (i) go ernmen
or sovereign power (de jure or de facto); (ii) military, naval, or air force;
or (iii) agen or a hori of an par specified in i or ii abo e. 159
Before Mondel z filed its complaint against its insurer, the United
States government publicly blamed the Russian military for the NotPetya
cyberattacks.160 The Press Secretary released a statement, boldly claiming
ha he R ssian mili ar la nched he mos des r c i e and cos l c berattack in history . . . . [It] caus[ed] billions of dollars in damage across
E rope, Asia, and he Americas. 161 The United States did not just blame
the NotPetya attacks in the media. Authorized by the Countering
America s Ad ersaries Thro gh Sanc ions Ac (CAATSA),162 the
President ordered the United States Treasury to impose economic
sanctions on Russia as punishment for launching NotPetya.163 With the
government publicly blaming a sovereign nation for cyberattacks against
the country, insurers are poised to successfully invoke the war exclusion
to avoid liability for these attacks.
IV. TERRORISM AND CYBER INSURANCE ARE TOO NARROW
TO COVER LOSSES ARISING FROM STATE-SPONSORED
CYBERATTACKS
Terrorism and cyberattacks are modern risks that now have specific
insurance policies available for insureds. These new policies are highly
specialized and come with various exclusions, leading many commercial
insureds to attempt to secure coverage under their commercial all risk
policies. With the rise of state-sponsored terrorism, insurers began
158. Id. at 2.
159. Id. at 4. Pharmaceutical company Merck was another victim of the NotPetya attacks and filed
a complaint against its insurers in New Jersey state court. See Complaint, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Ace
Am. Ins. Co., No. UNN-L-002682-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 2, 2018). Merck is seeking
co erage for ph sical loss or damage of an comp er da a, coding, program, or sof are as ell
as business interruption. Id. at 8 9. Merck s ins rers allegedl ha e also so gh o a oid co erage
under the war exclusion. Id. at 11.
160. See Statement from the Press Secretary, supra note 5.
161. Id.
162. Countering America s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat. 886
(2017). While this law was passed just after the NotPetya attacks, it also provides provisions to enact
sanctions against countries such as Iran and North Korea. Id. at 888 98, 940 55.
163. Press Release, U.S. Dep t of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Russian Cyber Actors for
Interference with the 2016 U.S. Elections and Malicious Cyber-Attacks (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0312 [https://perma.cc/BN7Z-BXTY].
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offering terrorism insurance coverage and writing exclusions specific to
terrorism.164 The traditional war exclusion could not apply because
terrorists do not officially act on the authority of a sovereign nation.165
Part IV discusses the war exclusion as applied to terrorism insurance
policies following the 9/11 attacks and the development of cyber
insurance policies. Although the NotPetya attacks can be viewed as acts
of cyberterrorism, an exploration of both terrorism and cyber insurance
policies shows that these tools are not suited for recovering physical and
time losses incurred from cyberattacks.
A.

Terrorism Insurance does not Cover State-Sponsored Acts 9/11
Serves as a Rare Exception

Until the 9/11 attacks occurred, courts consistently and confidently
refused to apply the war exclusion to acts committed by terrorist groups.166
Courts were comfortable determining that terrorist groups
[did] not appear to have acquired de facto government status
through their affiliation with government entities like the Taliban
or the former regime in Iraq. Therefore, any loss resulting from
terrorist acts by terrorist groups would not appear to be
proximately caused by any war waged by or between
recognized states
as traditionally recognized in insurance law.167
American insurance jurisprudence loosened after the 9/11 attacks,
although courts have been careful to draw narrow holdings.168 In light of
the attacks, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002,169
which generally required insurers to offer terrorism insurance to
commercial clients on the same terms as other types of insurance.170 These
insurance policies covered losses caused by terrorism but not acts of
war.171
In subsequent 9/11 litigation, the owner of a building near the World

164. See PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:18.
165. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (stating that a terrorist is a criminal and not viewed as a
soldier under federal law).
166. See supra Part I.
167. PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:21.
168. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff d, 751 F.3d 86 (2d Cir.
2014).
169. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107 297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
170. Id. at 2327 28.
171. In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
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Trade Center sued the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey as the
owner of the World Trade Center, under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA)172 for recovery of clean up expenses.173 The insurers for the
Por A hori claimed ha he a ack fell nder he errorism polic s ar
exclusion and denied payment.174 The co r concl ded ha he e ents of
[9/11] were unique, and Congress, the President, and the American public
rea ed 9/11 as niq e compared o prior erroris a acks.175 The court
allowed the insurers to apply the war exclusion and deny payment.176 To
bolster its decision, the court relied on he fac ha an ac of error and
de as a ion ha pro okes he response of ar can la er be charac eri ed
as an act of war.177 Ho e er, he co r emphasi ed ha i s holding as o
the act-of-war defense should be read narrowly, fitting the facts of this
case onl . I sho ld no be a preceden for cogna e la s of ins rance. 178
Wi h he rise of s a e-sponsored errorism, i is becoming more diffic l
to separate acts of war from acts of terrorism for the purpose of
interpreting insurance exclusions.179 War losses tend to be catastrophic in
scale and caused by sovereign military resources, which is why insurers
try to exclude them.180 Terrorism insurance, on the other hand, is designed
to cover unpredictable losses that are more akin to criminal, not military
acts.181 Courts should continue to interpret terrorism insurance coverage
narrowly and avoid making another exception like they did for 9/11.
B.

Cyber Insurance Is Inadequate to Cover Physical Losses from
Cyber Events

Cyber insurance policies are similar to terrorism insurance in that both
are narrow in application and are not sufficient on their own to provide
complete coverage for insureds in the event of a catastrophic loss.182 The
172. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601.
173. In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
174. See id. at 498 99.
175. Id. at 508.
176. Id. at 514.
177. Id. at 511.
178. Id. at 514.
179. Terrorism, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining s a e-sponsored errorism
as international terrorism sponsored by a sovereign government).
180. PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:1.
181. Id. § 152:21.
182. See Hunt, supra note 30, at 448.
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first cyber insurance policies were issued in the late 1990s, when
computers became more commonly used in commercial settings.183
Ho e er, mos c ber policies ill no co er ph sical damage o proper
or eq ipmen res l ing from a c ber e en . 184 Usually, the only first party
coverage available under cyber insurance policies are for cos s
associa ed i h los elec ronic da a and sof are res ora ion. 185 Cyber
ins rance policies, as he are ri en no , are no in ended o co er he
frequent and manageable business risks that may result in economic loss,
such as those associa ed i h ordinar b siness opera ions. 186 The
language of typical cyber insurance policies could preclude coverage for
cyber events caused by foreign nations, or at the very least preclude
coverage for the economic losses traditionally covered by time-element
provisions.187 Instead, businesses continue to rely on traditional property
insurance, rather than cyber insurance, to cover physical losses caused by
cyber events.
V.

INSURERS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ESCAPE LIABILITY
BY ASSERTING THE WAR EXCLUSION AND AVOID
LITIGATION THROUGH THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE

The circuit split created by the Universal Cable Co r s applica ion of
the political question doctrine should not deter courts from litigating war
exclusion cases. A closer examination of the case law relied upon in
Universal Cable reveals that war in the insurance context firmly remains
a judicial, not a political, question. For this reason, the courts handling
NotPetya war exclusion claims should not allow insurers to escape
liability for the losses caused by the cyberattacks. Part V first analyzes
Uni e al Cable reliance on Oetjen and distinguishes interpreting
treaties from insurance contracts. The second section of Part V applies the
traditional war exclusion analysis established in Pan Am and concludes
that insurers should remain liable for physical and time losses insured by
all risk property insurance policies.

183. Id. at 404.
184. Id. at 410.
185. Id. at 411.
186. Margaret A. Reetz et al., Cyber Risks: Evolving Threats, Emerging Coverages, and Ensuing
Case Law, 122 PA. ST. L. REV. 727, 736 (2018).
187. When a business s operations are interrupted by a covered peril, time loss or ime-elemen
coverage would apply to repay the insured s economic losses from the resultant inactivity. See Hunt,
supra note 30, at 412.
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Universal Cable In oca ion of he Poli ical Q e ion Doc ine Is
Misplaced

Although there is a split between the Second and Ninth Circuits on
whether the determination of sovereignty is a political question, the
interpretation of an insurance contract is not a matter of international law
and should remain a judicial issue.188 The Second Circuit in Pan Am and
the Southern District of New York in Holiday Inns draw a stark division
from he media and go ernmen s poli ical recogni ion of so ereigns and
the narrow definition of sovereign followed by the insurance industry.189
Those courts were of the firm belief that insurance policies must be
e amined in heir ins rance meaning and that it was the role of the
courts, not the media or the government, to make that determination.190
More recently, however, the Ninth Circuit has leaned on the holding of
Oetjen, and concluded ha [ ]ho is he sovereign, de jure or de facto, of
a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments of any government
concl si el binds he j dges. 191 The Universal Cable Court concluded
that determining the existence of war is a political question and only made
its decision based on the actions of the government.192
Going forward, courts should retain the power to determine if an entity
is a sovereign for the purposes of insurance policy interpretation. While
he Nin h Circ i s arg men in Universal Cable may seem reasonable, it
took the main source of law it relied upon out of context.193 The Court in
Oetjen was primarily concerned with the interpretation of the Hague
Convention and the validity of a purchase of real property from a Mexican
general.194 Generally, the President, either through himself or the State
Department, negotiates treaties and the Senate must give advice and
consent before the United States may ratify the agreement.195 In this
context, the Court logically would defer the determination of sovereignty
to the legislative and executive branches, as they were responsible for the
188. See supra Part II.
189. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that
[i]n commercial li iga ion arising o of ins rance policies, ords and phrases are cons r ed for
ins rance p rposes a con e q i e differen from hose of poli ics or jo rnalism ).
190. Id. at 1503.
191. Universal Cable Prods., LLC v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1143, 1158 59 (9th Cir.
2019) (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 299.
195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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ratification of the treaty.
However, the same issues of foreign policy are not present in the
negotiation or interpretation of an insurance contract. While courts may
have to grapple with politically charged facts arising from an insurance
policy, the legal issues are not political the decisions do not have the
same effect as international law. The parties of an insurance contract are
usually private entities, not nations. The interpretation of insurance
contracts is more akin to the interpretation of statutes, which have always
been i hin he j dicial branch s a hori .196 Just as the court retained the
common law property claims in Alperin, the insurance claims are similar
to common law insurance interpretation and should not be barred by the
political question doctrine.197 While war is a political topic, its existence
does not fall under the purview of the political q es ion doc rine: he
e is ence of ar depends on he legal con e in hich i arises, and ha
context and meaning are generally susceptible to judicial
iden ifica ion. 198 Therefore, the judicial determinations of sovereignty
carried out in Pan Am and Holiday Inns are appropriate.
B.

In the Context of the NotPetya Attacks, Insurers Should not be able
to Escape Liability Through the War or Warlike Actions Exclusion

Assuming that the courts retain the right to determine who is and is not
a sovereign within the meaning of an insurance policy, the NotPetya
attacks should remain covered despite the presence of a war or warlike
actions exclusion. Pursuant to Pan Am, war must be conducted between
two sovereign powers.199 To be considered a warlike operation, the
hostilities must be conducted in a theater of war and caused by a warlike
agency.200 The NotPetya hackers are not sovereigns under the insurance
definition of the term. The media and many governments around the world
believe that the Russian military sponsored the attacks, but Russia has not
publicly accepted responsibility.201 Even if the hackers were sovereigns
within the insurance meaning, the attacks were not conducted against

196. See generally Pearlstein, supra note 98 (arguing that the courts are not barred by the political
question doctrine to determine the existence of war for the purpose of statutory interpretation). See
supra section I.D.
197. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 548 (9th Cir. 2005).
198. Pearlstein, supra note 98, at 167.
199. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1012 (2d Cir. 1974).
200. Henry & MacGregor (Ltd.) v. Marten [1918] 34 TLR 504, 505 (KB); Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 505 F.2d at 1017.
201. Greenberg, supra note 141.
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another sovereign, but instead targeted companies across the world.202
Therefore, the parties to the attacks would still fail to meet the definition
of war within the meaning of the insurance policies at issue.
In addition to Mondel z International, Danish shipping conglomerate
Maersk, American pharmaceutical company Merck, and Ukranian
software company Linkos Group were also victims of the cyberattack.203
The insurers could try to argue that the companies were victims of warlike
operations, but it would be a stretch to call every affected company a
theater of war or a sufficient proxy for the sovereigns Russia allegedly
attacked.204 Complica ing he ins rer s arg men is he fac ha R ssia s
state-owned oil company Rosneft was also a victim of the cyberattacks.205
The insurers would be hard-pressed to argue that Russia, through the
NotPetya hackers, was attacking itself or was collateral in a warlike
operation.
Cyberwarfare is much like terrorism in that it often has no regard for
national borders. The law rigid and slow to evolve struggled to adopt
legal remedies, especially for terrorism.206 Following this trend, the courts
determining the coverage claims for Mondel z and others will likely
refuse to recognize a new interpretation of the war exclusion to allow the
insurers to avoid liability. Just as the Pan Am Court noted that Aetna was
aware of the risk of political plane hijackings and failed to explicitly
exclude such losses in its all risk policy,207 the NotPetya insurers should
reasonably have been aware of the risk of cyberattacks in the wake of
WannaCry and explicitly excluded such losses if they wished to avoid
liability.208
Regardless of the decision reached in the Mondel z and Merck suits,
insurers will be sure to adapt their practices in the future. The party that
will bear the burden of cyber losses may well be different in the coming
years. In a traditional war between nations, it is the governments, rather
than private insurers, that bear the burden of such losses.209 As the
landscape of modern warfare changes, the government may shoulder the

202. Satariano & Perlroth, supra note 1.
203. Id.; Greenberg, supra note 141.
204. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1012.
205. Satariano & Perlroth, supra note 1.
206. See generally In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff d, 751 F.3d 86
(2d Cir. 2014).
207. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1000.
208. See supra section III.B.
209. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 994 (noting at the time of he case ha American
underwriters do not write war risk coverage. Thus, Pan American had to turn to the United States
government for war risk coverage for he e cess o er he London marke limi ).
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burden for cyber losses as well. Until then, private insurers should more
clearly exclude all types of losses proximately caused by cyberattacks to
avoid liability. Large companies should also consider additional strategies
to protect their business interests from cyberattacks. Soon, they may not
be able to rely on insurers.
CONCLUSION
Commercial all risk property insurance policies are commonly held by
companies o pro ec losses o he ins red s proper . These policies
typically include a war exclusion, which specifically does not cover losses
arising from war or warlike actions. In the insurance industry, war must
be a conflict between two sovereign nations. While courts have not
hesitated to apply the war exclusion in periods of declared war, the
exclusion has become more ambiguous with the rise of terrorism and
cyberattacks. The determination of sovereignty and subsequently the
existence of war for purposes of the insurance policy can invoke
separation of power concerns. While the Second Circuit has historically
declined to apply the political question doctrine to its war exclusion
analysis, the Ninth Circuit has recently brought the political question
doctrine back to the forefront of its war exclusion jurisprudence.
Insurers should not be able to use the war exclusion for cyberterror
events. Going forward, they should adapt the terms of their policy
exclusions to better account for cyber-related losses across all types of
insurance policies. With the current wording of war exclusion provisions,
cyberattacks such as NotPetya would be considered closer to acts of
terrorism than acts of war because the conflicts are not between
sovereigns. Courts will not allow private insurers to shirk liability when
precedent urges the narrow application of the war exclusion. Although the
United States government and the media have been holding foreign
nations responsible for the cyberattacks, the response so far has not been
warlike when compared to the 9/11 attacks. Because the NotPetya attacks
are not warlike in the insurance sense, it is the responsibility of insurers
to specifically exclude physical and time losses related to cyberattacks in
order to ensure that they do not bear such liability in the future.
Governments provide insurance for losses caused by physical warfare
they should assume the risk for cyberwarfare as well. Modern warfare has
evolved since the war exclusion was first enacted in the eighteenth
century. The terms of the war exclusion must evolve too.

